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Expansion of the Investor Base for the Energy Transition 
Abstract 
Despite the emergence of the green bond market, the Energy Service Company (ESCO) 
model and green investment banks, the opportunities which the world’s capital markets 
present to increase the pool of potential investors and reduce project financing costs for 
renewable, energy efficient and low carbon assets remain under-exploited. This has been a 
persistent concern for policy-makers. We review the appeal of this sector to different classes 
of investor and assess the successes and failures of several innovative products including 
securitisations, yieldcos, green bonds, green investment banks and crowdfunding. We 
analyse the experiences with these products and suggest that policy needs to recognise how 
fiscal initiatives can leverage their inherent appeal.  
Keywords: investment, returns, renewable energy, green bonds, green investment banks, 
yieldco, crowdfunding, energy efficiency. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
Translating the Paris Agreement into action by the finance sector requires significant private 
capital to be mobilised for investment in renewable energy, energy efficiency, and clean 
technologies (OECD, 2016). Whilst direct public funding through grants, and market 
intervention policies such as feed-in tariffs, capacity payments and performance standards, 
have been successful in motivating the energy transition, ultimately the capital markets will 
need to sustain its development. In this context, market investors across the wide spectrum of 
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institutional, strategic, retail and communities will need a variety of attractive investment 
products and this raises a policy question of how they can be facilitated. This is a challenging 
prospect since, despite the size of the global capital markets, publicly-traded equity and bond 
markets have played a relatively small role in renewable energy financing (Hamilton and 
Zinder, 2016).  Some of the challenges in attracting investment, particularly for energy 
efficiency and energy retrofit projects, include adequate scale, standardization, liquidity, 
transferability, information asymmetry and investors unwillingness to assume development 
risk, OECD (2014). The implication is that it is not through a lack of potential capital, but the 
lack of appeal in matching projects with conventional market products (Eleftheriadis and 
Anagnostopoulou, 2015; Haigh, 2011; OECD, 2016).  
Investors can invest in specific stocks, but this has significant single asset risk. For diversified 
portfolios, there are various publicly traded alternative energy and cleantech indices including 
RENIXX World, Credit Suisse Global Alternative Energy Index, DAX global Alternative 
Energy Index and the S&P Global Clean Energy Index. However, there has been significant 
volatility in these assets particularly compared to investing in traditional energy utilities and 
institutional investors are often looking for low risk, steady returns.  
In this review, we critically assess the existing investment products for low carbon and 
renewable assets and consider the relevance of fiscal incentives to attract investors to these 
assets, particularly as direct government subsidy levels are being reduced. In section 2 we 
summarise the returns which various capital providers demand at different stages in 
renewable project lifecycles. Section 3 critically analyses the development and current state 
of the green bond market. In section 4, we explore the role of Green Investment Banks in 
promoting investment in low carbon assets. Section 5 examines securitisation and in 
particular the yieldco model.  Section 6 examines the crowdfunding model and suggests ways 
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this model could be further developed to promote investment in low carbon assets. Section 7 
concludes and discusses the wider considerations in facilitating financial products. 
2. Capital Providers and Return Requirements   
There are wide views upon what rate of return is required by investors in low carbon assets 
(Donovan and Nunez, 2012; Stratton, 2015, Salm et al., 2016) and this is mainly due to the 
heterogeneous engagement of different kinds of investors. Thus Figure 1 shows (in arrows) 
the timeline for a typical wind farm development while, underneath, the returns required (in 
2016) by various investors at different stages in the project lifecycle. Higher returns are 
demanded in the early stage compared to much lower returns required once the assets are 
operating. The recycling of early stage high risk capital with lower cost capital for 
operational assets is critical to attracting further capital and reducing the cost of capital 
overall.  
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Figure 1: Typical Windfarm Development Timeline and Representative Cost of Capital 
at Various Stages (from Hamilton and Zindler, 2016) 
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Whilst the investment model for renewable energy projects is reasonably well developed, as 
above, the same cannot be said for energy efficient assets. In general, energy efficiency is 
well known to offer huge scope in the energy transition but progress has mainly been through 
a steady expansion of mandatory policies, grants and building standards. The IEA (2016) 
estimated that two-thirds of economically viable2 energy efficiency potential will remain 
                                                 
1
 London Interbank Offered Rate is the average interbank interest rate at which a selection of banks on the 
London money market are prepared to lend to one another and is the commonly used reference rate for the cost 
of borrowing. Cost of borrowing is expressed in LIBOR + bps (where 100 bps equals 1%). The basis points 
represent the additional cost of borrowing which is a function of the project risk and credit risk of the borrower. 
 
2
 In the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA, 2012) economically viable investments are classified as 
competitive if the payback period for the up-front energy efficient investment is equal to or less than the amount 
Feasibility 
1-3 months 
Development 
1-5 years 
Construction 
.5-2 years 
Operating Assets 
25-35 years 
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unrealised with 70% of the world’s energy use being outside any efficiency performance 
requirement. Aside from the difficulties of quantifying energy savings and capital adequacy 
rules which may discourage banks’ lending to energy efficiency projects, the OECD (2016) 
suggested that the lack of financial instruments which are attractive to investors is a 
significant barrier to attracting capital for energy efficient projects. This sentiment is echoed 
by Hamilton and Zinder (2016) who suggest that energy efficient investments are not 
recognised as a distinct asset class and lack the scale to attract investors. They call for greater 
standardisation of products and increasing revenue certainty by using third party entities such 
as energy service companies (ESCOs) who can analyse and mitigate risk, which in turn, will 
help attract capital to the sector. They also note the development of securitization and bonds 
to enable large investments in multiple loans.  
In the US, Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) programmes which are loans provided 
for energy efficiency retrofits by states and municipalities often in partnership with private 
lenders have provided loans at lower cost than conventional lenders. The success of these 
products has been driven by the fact that the loan is added to the property tax bill and given a 
superior lien or charge to a mortgage loan. The emergence of pure-play ESCOs such a 
Hannon Armstrong3, a publicly listed company which provides debt and equity to fund 
renewable and energy efficiency projects, suggests there may be further growth opportunities 
for energy efficiency projects to be funded by the capital markets.  
 
3. Green Bonds  
The growth in the green bond market has been one of the most positive developments in 
capital markets supporting the low carbon energy transition. The Climate Bonds Initiative 
                                                                                                                                                        
of time that an investor might reasonably willing to wait to recover the cost, using the value of undiscounted 
fuel saving as the metric. 
3
 http://www.hannonarmstrong.com/index.php/asset-classes/energy-efficiency 
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(2018) reported a total of $1.45 trillion of ‘climate aligned’ bonds financing low carbon and 
climate resilient assets and projects outstanding at September 2018. However, of these only 
$389 billion are labelled green bonds with the balance being strongly-aligned or fully-aligned 
climate issuers4.  The largest issuers in 2017 were the European Investment Bank ($22.6 
billion), German state-owned bank KfW ($12.8bn) and the World Bank ($10.6bn), (Climate 
Bonds Initiative, 2017a). Investment quality is good with 23% AAA credit rated, 22% AA, 
16% A and 23% rated BBB.  
One of the main challenges to further market growth and investor confidence is the issue of 
green bond certification in response to rising investor concerns about "greenwashing" 
(Bloomberg, 2017a).  Under the current system of certification, there is no ex-post analysis or 
audit to verify that funds were actually used as advertised.  A number of competing 
certification standards have emerged  including the Green Bond Principles, and ‘green’ 
assessments from ratings agencies World Bank (2017)5.  While certification of green bonds is 
increasing in recent years with 65% of green bonds receiving external reviews in 2015, 77% 
in 2016 and 82% to June 2017, there remains no single standard. The other key issue is 
returns on green bonds vis-à-vis vanilla bonds. A report on returns to green bond investors by 
Climate Bonds Initiative (2017b) finds no conclusive evidence of a premium to investors for 
investing in green bonds.  
In summary, whilst the global bond market currently stands at $90 trillion, green bond 
issuance in 2017 was slightly over $100 billion.  It appears that in order to attract more 
mainstream investors to green bonds, a single credible certification systems need to be 
                                                 
4
 Green bonds if at least 95% of bond proceeds are dedicated to green assets and labelled green by the issuer. 
Fully-aligned are not designed green by issuer but derive >95% of revenues from climate-aligned assets and 
green business lines with strongly-aligned deriving 75-95% of revenues from same. 
5
 http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/htm/Chapter-2-Green-Bond-Principles.html 
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developed. Ongoing monitoring of the performance of bonds post issuance will also be 
required to increase investor confidence and for the market to reach its full potential.  
4. Green Investment Banks  
A green investment bank (GIB) is a publicly capitalised entity established specifically to 
facilitate private investment into domestic low-carbon and climate-resilient infrastructure and 
other green sectors such as water and waste management, OECD (2016). GIBs have been 
capitalised from a variety of sources including carbon taxes, emissions trading schemes, 
renewable portfolio standards and energy efficiency resource standards. While GIBs have 
invested directly in low carbon assets and infrastructure using a number of different 
structures including senior and subordinated loans, bond based financing and equity, arguably 
a more important role of the GIBs has been the provision of risk-mitigation and credit 
enhancements such as loan loss reserves, subordination and guarantees.  
Loan loss reserves are where the GIB sets aside capital to repay losses which helps reduce 
repayment risk for private investors. Subordination is where cash flows are paid to investors 
in order of seniority. GIBs have invested in equity and mezzanine instruments that rank after 
private investors senior debt investment, meaning the private investors would be repaid first 
in event of default. By providing a loan guarantee, a GIB agrees to repay a portion of the loan 
to a senior lender if the borrower cannot. By providing loss reserves, subordination and 
guarantees, risk is significantly reduced for private sector investors and the probability of 
repayment is increased.  GIBs have also enabled transactions by creating warehousing and 
securitisation instruments which allows bundling of smaller scale projects to achieve scale 
and reduce transaction costs. The GIBs have played a significant role in aggregating smaller 
projects in a single security which otherwise would not be financeable. Through these 
enabling actions GIBs have been instrumental in overcoming the main barriers to investment 
in low carbon assets by scaling up smaller investments, by pooling and aggregating, thus 
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reducing transaction costs and effectively underwriting investment risk through their various 
credit enhancement actions. Furthermore, GIBs provide confidence as transaction leaders and 
as co-investors for private investors including local lenders, banks, institutional and retail 
investors OECD (2016). Nevertheless, being publicly capitalised, they require further policy 
initiatives to make a bigger impact. 
5. Securitisation and Yieldcos  
Securitization is a well-understood process in financial markets whereby real assets are 
pooled and the cash flows from these assets are repackaged and sold as tradeable, interest-
bearing securities. Securitization originated in the 1970s when home mortgages were pooled 
by US government backed agencies, (Jobst, 2008).  This created an asset-backed security in 
which the underlying real estate acted as collateral.  The attraction of the securitization model 
for renewable energy and energy efficient assets is that is allows the translation of cash flows 
from real assets into financial assets in the form of debt or equity securities. While its 
reputation may have temporarily suffered during the "subprime crisis", its appeal is very 
strong in principle.  
Since the early 1980s, the so-called yield-based investment vehicles, primarily in the US the 
“master limited partnerships” (MLPs)6, have been a popular option for conventional energy 
companies seeking capital (EY, 2015). MLPs were not available for renewables, but by 2013, 
the growing investor appetite for products with real yields derived from the cash flows of 
solar and wind installations led to the spectacular rise of a similar financial vehicle, the 
“yieldco”.  A yieldco is formed when a utility or Independent Power Producer bundles a 
number of fully operational renewable energy assets into a new company (the yieldco) and 
                                                 
6
 MLPs are publicly traded investments which are structured as a partnership so investors are only taxed on 
distributions and there is no taxation at the corporate level. At least 90% of income must be “qualifying income” 
from exploring, producing, transporting, storing, processing, refining and certain activities related to certain 
minerals and natural resources (EY 2015). 
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sells a minority stake (usually 30-40%) in the yieldco to public market equity investors 
(Strattan Report, 2015). The yieldco distributes the cash flows from these assets as dividends 
to shareholders. These gave an average dividend yield of 6.2% in 2015 (Jacobs, 2016). They 
achieved this high yield by generally distributing 70-90% of available cash flows to 
shareholders (Urdanick, 2014). Moreover, yieldcos proved a tax efficient vehicle for 
renewable energy projects as dividends are sheltered from tax due to high capital costs and 
generous capital and depreciation allowances. Taxes are often paid upon sale of the asset at 
the long-term capital gains rate as opposed to income tax which is generally taxed at a higher 
rate. Due to net operating losses, cash distributions are often considered return of capital, 
which lowers an investor’s cost basis (EY 2015).  
A further attraction of the yieldco is that investors’ portfolio risk is reduced as the 
single asset risk from investing in just one renewable project is eliminated (Climate Policy 
Initiative, 2016). Operating renewable energy assets are attractive to capital market investors 
due to stable cash flows, often through government subsidies, which allow for high dividend 
payments. They also provide a long-term inflation hedge, and represent investment in a 
mature technology with low risk and a low correlation with other asset classes (Hamilton and 
Zindler 2016). From a project developer perspective, hiving operating assets into the yieldco 
structure allows the developer to free up their balance sheet, improving the debt to equity 
ratio which is important for the company’s credit rating and cost of debt (Moody’s, 2016). 
Reynolds (2015) suggests that yieldcos are an alternative to traditional project finance that 
offer better value through lower cost of capital. From a valuation perspective, the rationale 
for the yieldco structure may also be explained by Nanda’s (1991) carve out theory: firms 
that resort to equity carve outs are generally undervalued by the market and the sale of equity 
to a subsidiary is good news for the value of the parent. While the attractions of the yieldco 
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model are understood by capital market participants, the structure has received very little 
attention by researchers (Srinivasan and Reddy, 2016). 
The key point that we make is that it was the tax and accounting arrangements that facilitated 
the growth of the yieldcos, and by extension brought extra capital into renewable projects. 
Tax treatment is a significant factor in attracting investment but it is not a well-developed 
theme in energy policy research. Yet, Bobinaite and Tarvydas (2014) suggest that tax 
incentives are the most widely used policy instrument globally to promote investment in low 
carbon assets. The most commonly used tax incentives are deductions, exemptions or reduced 
corporate tax rates for businesses and income tax rates for individuals, but some countries 
have also introduced reduced property taxes and VAT rates to promote investment (Cansino 
et al., 2010; Cansino et al., 2011; Mundaca and Luth Richter, 2015; Solangi et al., 2011). Tax 
relief targeted at individuals can in some instances effectively double the post-tax return on 
investment, Bergstresser and Poterba (2002). The partnership structure which allows financial 
losses in the early years of a project to be offset against all other income has been particularly 
effective in attracting retail investors to renewable energy projects in Denmark (Tranaes, 
1996) and Germany (Yildiz, 2014). 
However, one of the problems with the yieldco structure and the expectations of high 
performance is that yieldcos will typically need to acquire new assets in order to maintain 
high annual depreciation expenses. This can tempt the rapid acquisition of over-priced assets 
and was indeed the main reason for the drop in value which yieldcos experienced after their 
early enthusiasm. Some yieldcos took higher risks than investors anticipated, and the high 
profile bankruptcy of Sun Edison (Financial Times 2016) created more caution in the sector. 
Whilst it is clear that securitisation appears to be essential to re-cycle capital in large volumes 
along the timeline of renewable energy projects, and that yieldcos are a viable mechanism, 
they should not need to rely on the rapid acquisition of assets and instead have more 
12 
 
established favourable tax treatments, such as the MLPs, in order to become stable and 
sustainable financial vehicles. 
6. Crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding can be defined as “the collective effort by people who network and pool their 
money together, usually via the internet, in order to invest in and support efforts initiated by 
other people or organizations”; Ordanini et al (2011), Andrea et al. (2011). Data from the 
Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (2016)7 shows that the total European online 
alternative finance market, which includes crowdfunding, peer-to-peer lending and other 
activities grew by 92% to reach €5,431 million in 2015. There is considerable research and 
policy interest in the behavioural element of how sharing local value in renewable projects 
can build social support for the low carbon transition, (Devine-Wright, 2014, Ricardo Energy 
and Environment, 2017, Toke et al., 2008, Curtin, 2016). Solar PV and wind power work 
well for a crowdfunding model because of the technology maturity, modularity, high 
reliability, the simplicity of the power generation process, and availability of technical service 
providers for these technologies (Yildiz, 2014). Debt based crowdfunding has become the 
dominant form of lending but there is very little liquidity for retail investors, (Harder and 
Friggens, 2015).  
For the crowdfunding model to reach its full potential, issues around licensing and regulation 
of crowdfunding platforms need to be resolved8. Codes of conduct need cover due diligence, 
risk management and information disclosures to protect investors. Tax reliefs may also be an 
important element. In the UK for example, investors in certain crowdfunded assets can invest 
through a tax efficient Individual Savings Account. 
                                                 
7
 https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/research/centres/alternative-finance/downloads/2016-
european-alternative-finance-report-sustaining-momentum.pdf 
 
8http://eurocrowd.org/2017/11/02/ec-legislative-proposal-eu-framework-crowd-peer-peer-finance-now-open-
feedback/ 
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7. Summary of Success and Failures of Innovative Products 
 Successes Failures 
Green Bonds  Standardised 
 Highly liquid asset – 
traded on exchange 
 Price transparency 
 Information asymmetry 
reduced due to 
information disclosure 
through exchanges / 
credit rating agencies 
 Concerns re 
‘greenwashing’ 
 No single accreditation 
standard 
 No ex poste audit to 
verify use of funds 
Green Investment 
Banks 
 Reduced risk for equity 
investors through credit 
enhancement 
 Aggregation allows for 
risk reduction  
 Scale reduces transaction 
costs 
 Role as transaction 
leaders gives confidence 
to other investors 
 Publicly capitalised 
entities so need further 
funding to have a bigger 
impact 
Securitizations / 
Yieldcos 
 Aggregation and scale 
 Reduces single asset risk 
 Allows for early stage 
expensive capital to be 
recycled with lower risk 
capital as projects are 
built 
 Improves credit quality of 
project developer 
 Tax efficient structure 
maximises return to 
investors 
 Model is unsustainable 
unless tax structure 
become more MLP-like 
Crowdfunding  Investment opportunities 
for small retail investors  
 Enhances buy-in and 
social acceptance 
 Model does not scale 
 Single asset risk 
 Illiquid investment 
 Typically does not allow 
for aggregation of project 
risk 
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8. Conclusion 
The development of mature and sustainable financing mechanisms is critical to the success of 
the energy transition. As central government support through grants becomes more focussed 
upon research and development and early stage demonstration projects, and subsidies become 
less generous for mature technologies, investors in large volumes will need to be attracted to 
the products which the capital markets provide. In this review we have looked at the scope, 
successes and problems of the emerging financial products for this sector, including green 
bonds, green investment banks, securitisations and crowd-funding. They are all showing 
substantial potential but also difficulties. Green bonds face certification and trust issues; 
green investment banks require a mature financial sector to work alongside government 
policy initiatives, yieldcos need tax benefits and crowdfunding has community appeal but 
may remain local in scale.  
From a policy perspective, it is clear from this review that regulatory oversight and fiscal 
incentives need further development. Tax benefits may be more effective than subsidies, as 
demonstrated by the rise of the yieldco model at the institutional level and the potential for 
crowdfunding growth at the local levels. Implementation of regulatory and legislative 
changes to allow the creation of publicly listed investment vehicles which would eliminate 
taxation at the corporate level would clearly be a step forward. The emergence of such 
vehicles, akin to what MLPs provided for US oil and gas investors, would allow investors to 
utilise any tax losses and would increase the post-tax return on renewable, energy efficient 
and other low carbon investments. This review has also highlighted the need for certification 
standards in green bonds and emphasised the positive benefits that policy makers can achieve 
through facilitating the growth of green investment banks. Evidently, a desire to include a 
wide variety of different institutional, private equity and debt investors with various 
risk/return targets requires a sustainable and wide mixture of financial vehicles which could 
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be well-leveraged by selective policy interventions on tax and standards, and this will be 
more cost-effective in motivating than persisting with direct and selective subsidies. 
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